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The work we are going about is this, to dig...and to sow corn, and to eat our bread
together by the sweat of our brows...that we may work in righteousness and lay the
foundation of making the earth a common treasury for all, both rich and poor....Not
enclosing any part into any particular hand, but all as one man working together and
feeding together...not one lording over another, but all looking upon each other as
equals in the creation...*
H
 Gerrard Winstanley 1649 (1973:84)
Introduction
Collective forms of organization in production along with common ownership of land and
other resources have a long history of discussion that goes back way beyond the Levellers
of the seventeenth century like Winstanley, probably at least to Plato and Aristotle
(Schlatmr 1951). To recall this duration and to recall as well the breadth of standpoints
that have emerged in that time is a useful corrective to parochialism. As debates about the
shape of our future society acquire momentum we may be inclined to believe that South
African concerns and circumstances have few precedents. This is by no means the case.
One of mv aims in this paper is to show the diversity of ideas about producers' cooperatives
and self-management that exist,™ and to argue strongly that viewpoints which are
oreconceived on political grounds, whether positive or negative, are not a satisfactory
starting point for discussing land policies, nor indeed for any other matters involving
organizational change.
It is true that in recent times collective decision-taking and ownership have been the
preoccupation mainly of groups on the left of the political spectrum. But it seems also true
first that this alignment has emerged only in the past century, and then as a direct result ot
the rise to prominence of 'liberal democratic theory'. A central concern of this body of
thought is to legitimate private rights to property, to write into law an individual right to
the exclusive use and disposal of parcels of the resources provided by nature and of parcels
of the S created by'past work on them' (Macpherson 1978: 199-200). So that any
subsequent espousal of an alternative, or a restriction on such nghts, has now come to
appear, simply by contrast, as left-wing.
(11 In this field there is a variegated terminology which can be confusing. I discuss the distinction between
Zoeratives collectives and communes later in this section but it should be noted that 'self-management,
'workers' control', 'co-determination' and 'profit-sharing' all refer to an tapping range of institutions,
yet lay emphasis on different features of the same organizational arrangements.
Secondly, there have been, and still are, strong religious, ethical and nationalist motives for
advocating cooperative ownership and enterprise as alternatives to the wage relationship,
whether the employer be capitalist firm or state corporation. These may or may not
coincide with the political objectives of labour and socialist movements. Prominent
examples in the contemporary world, of production and sometimes also consumption units
organized for such varying motives, are a proportion of Israeli kibbutzim and moshavim,
cooperatives of small and large scale in the US plywood industry and the Mondragon
conglomerate in Spain, as well as religious communes, usually in the agricultural sector,
like the Hutterite colonies of North America (Bonin & Puttennan 1987: 4-8, 143f; Vanek
1975).
Thirdly, the progress of reform along with the changing context of its discussion in centrally
planned economies has initiated the re-thinking of old ideological concepts and categories.
It used to be the orthodox view that greater centralisation was the direction followed in the
evolution of socialist institutions towards 'advanced forms',^ but it is coming to be
accepted that 'higher levels of economic development now call apparently for less direct
allocation and more market, arid not the other way round, at least compared with the
system introduced at the beginning of the 1930s' (Brus 1988: 441). Furthermore, for the
past forty years Yugoslav self-management institutions have been rationalised as
acceptably socialist on grounds of both the achievement of direct democracy in the basic
units of production and distrust of a strong centralised d3!
As I argue later in this paper, I am sceptical that collectivized agriculture is an institutional
form that promises much for a development path more broadly-based and redistributive
than that followed in South A« lea's past.*41 Yet, a more favourable judgement is
also possible and would be valid if the evidence and its interpretation is appropriately
marshalled. But, to repeat, what would not be acceptable are a priori arguments, either
favouring cooperative forms of organization because they appear to conform to some
undefined conception of a socialist economy, or alternatively, condemning them because
they seem to conflict with the postulate of individual maximization in a pure market model.
What has economic theory to say about worker-owned and worker-managed enterprises?
Are there clear-cut lessons to be culled from the experience of collectivized agriculture in
centrally planned economies (CPEs)? What other historical examples, like the kibbutz and
the 'Basic Organisations of Associated Labour* in Yugoslavia, can be consulted for
guidance in the assessment? And finally, what is to be learned from placing these answers,
however tentative they be, within the South African arena of discussion? These are the
four issues addressed in this paper.
[2] For instance, until recertify it was official Soviet rhetoric to describe state farms (Sovkhoiy) as a 'hitfter
form* of socialised property than collective farms (Kolkhozy).
[3] Tliat Stalin condemned this institutional form as heretical is in the contemporary world an added reason for
rejecting the simple identification of centralised control with an advanced form of socialist democracy.
[4] It may be as well to admiU like one of the sources used in pre-paring this paper (Nolan 198& 1), that in the
past I accepted a common interpretation of Chinese experience to be found in the English language
literature whicli held collectivization to be a strategy promising much for developing countries.
Before closing this introduction it seems advisable to say something about definitions.
Generally speaking, a producers' cooperative (PC) is an enterprise in which all workers are
members; who participate in control of the work environment, management and the taking
of strategic decisions; who share in the distribution of net income; and who earn a return
on capital. Normally one member-one vote is the governing principle, and 'all that is
strictly ruled out is for individuals or institutions to be accorded decision-making or
membership rights...by virtue of an ownership or creditor relationship [alone]' (Bonin &
Putterman 1987:62,143).
This definition lends itself to further extension, which can be brought out by a contrast with
the organizational form we know best. In a pure capitalist enterprise, worker participation
in decisions and receipt of profit is zero; in a pure cooperative, member-worker control as
well as ownership (and therefore their claim to revenue earned over costs, ie. the profit
residual) is 100 per cent. In between there are differences in the extent to which producers
have an effective voice 'through participation in assemblies, the election of representative
organs and involvement in the appointment of managers' (Nuti 1987: 465). Similarly,
there is variation also in respect to the contracts they enter and by the terms of which they
share with capitalists in the results of their effort and enterprise. These questions are
addressed in the literature on codetermination and profit-sharing. What provokes
divergent opinion, even controversy, is whether a 'pure' producers1 cooperative remains
true to its organizing principles if it hires non-member labour and allows unequal share
ownership, in the way of differential capital holdings and profit pay outs to worker-
members. Vanck (1975: 11-36) is a useful survey and typology.
Lastly, while 'collectives', 'communes' and 'cooperatives' tend to be used interchangeably,
in theagricultural sector there is one distinction which needs noting. In a collective farm
or producer cooperative the labour supplied by several households works land under joint
management 'such that there are no individual claims to the output of identifiable sub-
fields or plots...and the predominant principle of distribution is in proportion to work input.
A similar unit distributing in disregard of work input, eg. according to an equal claims
principle' is called a communal farm (Putterman 1985:197).
This difference is significant for analytical reasons, but linguistic usage has become
corrupted by history and ideology. In the case of 'collectives' it is the association with
Soviet institutions which causes the problem. From the beginning cooperative principles
were negated in the collectivization drive; for instance, by coercive membership, by rules
and norms imposed from outside, by wage payments rather than dividends and by
communist party appointments and promotions. 'Communes' on the other hand, has been
the label applied in China to agricultural production units using both distribution systems,
namely according to need or to equal claims and according to work points (Nolan 1988:32;
Bonin & Putterman 1987:127). These collectives and communes are examined further in a
later section of the paper.
Theoretical perspectives
At least one strand of orthodox economics is sceptical about the efficiency and stability
properties of producer cooperatives (PCs). It is clearly pertinent to understand why In the
past 20-30 years a number of contributions to the literature (notably by Ward and Domar)
have sought to show that a self-managed enterprise - synonymous here with a PC - will
respond perversely to changes in its economic environment. They demonstrate this by
contrasting two production organizations, identical except that one is conventionally profit-
maximizing in the capitalist mould and the other a dividend-paying P C One striking
inference drawn from this exercise is that the self-managed unit will always contain a
smaller labour contingent.
The technical reason is that the equilibrium marginal product of labour has to be higher in
the cooperative than in the labour-hiring firm, and therefore the -units of labour in the
former fewer in number. Intuitively understood, this is because the marginal worker-
member must be producing a contribution to the cooperative's total revenue which exactly
matches the average dividend payment, ie. total revenue divided by the number of PC
members. This marginal product will always be higher than that of the marginal worker in
the capitalist firm who is being paid no component of surplus but only the wage. And the
higher marginal product in the cooperative means a smaller number employed, given
standard assumptions about the technology and the competitiveness of product and labour
markets.*5'
The argument has been extended to show that, stemming from the same intrinsic feature, a
favourable change in a PC's economic environment, like a rise in the price of its product or
fall in fixed cost, causes a contraction of activity whereas, per contra, in its capitalist
counterpart there would be expansion. Again the explanation for this perverse 'backward
bending supply curve' is that the average dividend per head increases more than the value
of the marginal member's product increases. So it is in the interest of the remaining
recipients - the N-minus-one cooperative membership - to lay off the marginal member and
obtain thereby higher average shares for themselves. Other predicted outcomes of the
model are a reluctance to engage in self-financed investment, rising capital-labour ratios in
response to the increased implicit cost of labour, and a tendency wLh declining numbers
for the self-managed enterprise to metamorphose eventually into a single-owner capitalist
firm with hired labour.
Our interest lies in asking what this theoretical treatment should alert us to in assessing
cooperatives for employment generation and income creation in South African agriculture.
There are a number of points to ponder. First, perverse responses appear to arise because
those members appropriating the revenue are postulated both to have narrow objectives as
individual maximizers but also to be collective owners with the authority jointly to make
decisions about their own numbers. In other words, exit from and eatry into the enterprise
are a choice variable exclusive to them. The prediction is that a successful PC will attract
[5] To expand Otis explanation further: when the maximand (the variable being maximized) b income per
member rather titan profit per worker (surplus over wage costs, assuming for simplicity that labour is the
only purchased input) as in the capitalist firm, then the former magnitude will always be the greater.
Cooperative members will be receiving in the dividend what is in effect a wage plus profit share. Then,
given that the technology will exhibit diminishing returns so that labour's marginal product is lower than its
average product over the relevant output range, efficiency requires that units of labour be paid the value of
their marginal products. But in the cooperative these have to be higher because labour is paid more;
hence it follows that the equilibrium employment level (determined by a higher position on the total
product curve) wilt be lower than in the profit maximizing firm (Ward 195S; Estrin 1983: 14-22; Bonin &
Puttennan 1987:13-21; Puttcrman 1989:336-8).
aspiring entrants - either from a labour pool or from less prosperous cooperatives,
depending upon what is assumed about the wider economy - whom it is unwilling to admit.
The trouble arises because PC units are immune from labour market forces; they enjoy a
form of monopoly power which they are free to deploy in their group interest. A pertinent
question is whether this power is a fundamental component of self-management
democracy, or does it instead conflict with the wider notion of a democratic economy?
Secondly, is short-run dividend maximization in fact a rational objective for the individual
alone, given that one implied outcome could be loss of membership oneself? Much
depends on what is assumed, not only about the representative member's preferences but
also about hierarchies, social differentiation and coalition-formation within the
membership. As Joan Robinson asked in response to these models: 'when profitability
increases due to a change in a financial parameter [like the price of their product], how
shall the members choose whom among the brethren will be dismissed so that the
remaining members will enjoy a higher remuneration?' (Bonin & Putterman 1987: 20-
21) .^ In addition, long run survival of the cooperative is as much an individual as a
collective objective when the labour force itself is postulated to play the role of
entrepreneur.
Thirdly, what is clearly pertinent too is the extent to which the odd behaviour predicted by
this self-management model depends on the technical assumptions adopted in the original
version (Ward 1958). Since then, models of increased complexity have been constructed,
for example, incorporating more than one product, multiple inputs, alternative avenues of
employment for labour, and containing an explicit, identification of membership rights and
duties. These do exhibit markedly less perversity, although the PCs slowness of response
to changes in parameters like prices and costs, relative to the response speed of capitalist
firms, still remains (Bonin & Putterman 1987; Estrin 1983; and contributions in Vanek
1975).
Finally, there is a considerable literature concerning the empirical applicability of these
theoretical ideas about self-management, although there seems little consensus on
whether real world examples do behave the way the theory predicts. For instance, there is
no clear evidence that membership limitation is a short-term policy tactic used to raise
earnings in Yugoslav units of self-management (BOALs), nor in the Mondragon
cooperatives and certainly not in the kibbutzim. But whether a tendency for longer-term
attrition of the membership through retirement and non-replacement is present is more
problematic Unemployment has been, and still remains, a major problem in parts of
Yugoslavia, and the existence of cooperative institutions may or may not be a causative
influence. '
In Soviet and Chinese collectives, the issue simply does not arise because for most of their
history entry and exit rules were strictly determined by outside authority. But such control
[6J It is hardly surprising that this implication of the model is unpalatable to proponents of self-management:
'how can one reasonably expect that a working collective wilt mutilate itself (kicking ouU say, one-tenth of
the membership), if it has already realized a significant gain from a price increase, say 10 per cent of
income, for the sake of gaining an extra, say 1 per cent? Indeed, this sounds tike an extract from a book of
rules of capitalist conduct,' (Vanek 1975:356).
may itself have been initiated by suspicion of self-serving autonomy. As Maurice Dobb
once asserted about the pre-reform planned economies: There is little doubt that this fear
[of bias in the functioning of workers' collectives] has done much to harden the hearts of
planners and senior administrators against changes involving enhanced democratic
participation in framing policy at the enterprise level* (1970: 66).
A related concern is whether concentrating on the internal workings of a PC to the
exclusion of all institutions in its decision-taking environment yields too partial a view,
perhaps even a distortion, in this line of theorizing. In particular, the existence of a wider
organization to which self-managed enterprises belong, and from which they consciously
draw certain values and precepts along with institutional support, may be a key factor in
their survival. In that case, when modelling the criteria that cooperative members apply in
their decision-taking, a social compact that encompasses the worker-controlled sector as a
whole would need to be incorporated, like that animating the kibbutzim movement in
Israel.171 This could rationalize the presence of values like solidarity, security and worker
satisfaction, as well as an emphasis on collective consumption and growth-mindedness
within successful self-managed units.
To sum up, there is as yet no standard view on how much utility this strand of theory has in
providing insights into and supporting predictions about cooperative behaviour. A
procedure that teases out the short-run implications of an assumed change in one variable
taken at a time ('comparative statics'), and containing little institutional substance, may
well generate the 'widespread dissatisfaction with these models expressed by applied
workers in this field...[who] have generally denied that such firms actually do reduce
membership as cost or demand conditions improve' (Estrin 1983: 246). But perhaps this
means little more than that such propositions should not be treated as definitive and
complex when assessing the properties of self-managed enterprise as compared with other
organizational forms. And clearlyalso such models should certainly not be used to support
a priori judgements of any kind. With that in mind Putterman's appraisal is a sobering one.
'Agricultural producers' cooperatives having membersMp-determining powers
appear to behave much as the models predict. Unless they are part of a
movement that takes membership expansion or job creation as a goal in its own
right or acts under the direction of or in identification with an organization
representing workers or farmers as a class (and not only their own immediate
members), such APCs [agricultural producer cooperatives] tend to expand,
if at all by hiring non-member employees, with new membership largely
limited to children and other family members of existing members. The classic
cases are the agricultural producers' cooperatives of Peru and Chile, which were
created on former haciendas, through the agrarian neforms of the 1960s and
early 1970s... (1989: 338)
(71 Vanek (1975) argues forcefully that a 'sheltering organization' is essential for cooperative enterprises within a
market economy; amongst other reasons this is because, when single and operating in isolation, PCs are
disadvantaged in raising capital, dearly Die same difficulties may not arise in economies where there are
non-market sources of mobilizing capital.
A related cluster of issues concerns incentives, work monitoring and the alternatives to
hierarchical control that are feasible in self-managed enterprises. These are of first
importance. Economic thought, at least the dominant stream of it, has always underscored
individual material gain as the prime source of motivation in production. This has two
aspects, linked but separate. First, an emphasis on performance-based rewards in
distribution; and second, a justification for private property claims of one kind or
another.181
Now, a producers1 cooperative as we have defined it may conflict on either or both these
counts with the orthodox postulate that material incentives are paramount. There may be
strongly-held normative grounds for rejecting private property rights, as until recently was
the case in socialist bloc countries, most kibbutzim and many cooperative movements. But
rather weaker and more ambivalent attitudes prevail in respect to the first question:
should payment be work-based or should it be needs-based within the self-managed
enterprise? In the literature, this choice is sometimes posed as that between the principle
of desert (what is deserved) and the principle of equal claims. Distribution by equal claims
is not the same as distribution by needs, for well-known reasons, but I ignore that here and
treat them synonymously.
A prominent historical example where material incentives were downplayed is that of the
Chinese communes during the Great Leap Forward period of the late fifties and early
sixties. It is generally admitted now, even in China, that their needs-based distribution
policies were premature and too extreme, with 'a strong detrimental effect on work
incentives, since the individual worker's effort now had little effect on his/her income*
(Nolan 1988: 56). The problem has been illustrated neatly in game theory form, using the
so-called 'prisoner's dilemma' setting.191
Suppose that a typical member of a cooperative considers
two alternatives, viz., to work hard (Ii) and not to work hard (Io).
He may make two assumptions about others in the cooperative, viz.,
that they will work hard (Rj) or that they will not (RQ). Consider a
system in which people are paid according to needs (and not work),
whereas their main concern is with their own welfare. A typical
ranking of alternatives may then take the form (in decreasing order
of preference): IQRI, I1R1, IQRQ, I J R 0 . By working harti oneself
[81 That which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it Everyone thinks chiefly of
his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an
individual. For besides other considerations, everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he
expects another to fulfil,.1Aristotle, Politics (quoted in Schlatter 1951:15).
[91 'Prisoner's dilemma1 is a nickname for the theoretical game depicting the choice situation facing two rational
egoists who pursue their individual self interest to the exclusion of all other considerations. It can be
shown that such behaviour is self-defeating in the straightforward sense that achiexing individual goals b
rendered more difficult: 'a strategy may depend crucially on how many others adopt it and the fact that a
strategy initially successful may become self-defeating because its success leads others to imitate it\
(Rapoport 1987: 975-6). 'Vie universal fascination with this game is due to its representing in very stark
and transparent fonn, the bitter fact Oiat when individuals act for their OHTI benefit, the result may well be
disaster for all' (Aumann 1987:468).
one adds very little to one's income since the principle of
distribution is not work but needs, but there is still the hardship of
toil. So given the actions of others, everyone may prefer not to
work hard, i.e., prefer Io to Ii, no matter whether the others do Ro
or R\. But at the same time they may each prefer everyone working
hard to no one working hard, since the latter may be disastrous for
all. In such a situation, however, guided by rational calculus
everyone ends up not working hard, i.e. doing IQ, which is a strictly
dominant strategy. But each would have preferred that all had
worked harder. Individual rational calculations would seem to lead
all to disaster* (Sen 1973: 97).
That producers' cooperatives may be seriously affected by incentive problems intrinsic to
their organizational form is a question treated at some length in the more theoretical
literature (Vanek 1975; Bonin & Putterman 1987; Nolan 1988; Putterman 1989). But it
tends rather to be neglected in political economy discussions, or alternatively it is taken by
presumption that altruistic preferences ('moral incentives* and a collecu'vist consciousness)
exist within and amongst individuals by virtue simply of their voluntary membership and
participation. There are a series of issues here which must be considered.
First, recognizing the possibility of shirking, in the sense of slack in the work process and a
low intensity of effort, raises the question of monitoring and its costs. Under capitalism the
profit receivers, * residual claimants' as they are called, have a direct interest in the
supervision of wage paid labour, who by presumption have little incentive to be diligent
and responsible unless appropriately rewarded or punished, ultimately by loss of job. By
contrast, in cooperatives residual claimancy status is diffused amongst the members
themselves, which can have both positive and negative consequences for work effort. On
the one hand, there can be 'positive collusion' or 'horizontal monitoring* within the peer
group to encourage effort: 'If the numbers involved are not too large and shirking imposes
perceptible losses on co-workers with whom there is some personal interaction...This
represents a reversal of the widely observed "negative collusion" to restrict output under
traditional piece-pay schemes, where informal social sanctions and even violence against
"rate-busters" have a lengthy history" (Cable & Fitzroy 1980:103). On the other hand, it
has been argued (by Alchian and Demsetz) that incentives to monitor performance are
weakened because they are insufficiently concentrated in cooperatives. No single member
is an exclusive residual claimant, and monitoring effort is peculiar in being itself non-
monitorable because inherently difficult to perceive, and therefore it cannot be
satisfactorily purchased as a service input. This is clearly contentious (Bonin & Putterman
1987:46-52; McCain 1982).1101 It may also be that hiring monitors, or appointing members
to act as such whether or not differential shares are paid to them, would be a practice that
sits uneasily within the philosophy of self-management. This is an equity question. But
there can also be an efficiency one where the distribution principle is egalitarian. 'Work
[WJ T7ie peculiarity [according to Ote Alchian-Demsetz contention] is that monitoring can not simply be
purchased by the team, because it is difficult to observe, and because ultimately it is necessary to answer
Oie question "WJto monitors the monitor?"...a special incentive mechanism is required...by having the agent
who monitors the other service contributors...[also] having claim to the emerprises's income net of those
n r n . . n „_/.- f!* mvif i l l1 /Piitfttminn 7O.CC' AS\payments [ie. profit}' (Putterman 19SS: 48).
supervision to ensure adherence to a "sincere effort" contract involves many problems
[like aIienation]...The feasibility of using [member] payments according to needs combined
with vigorous supervision of work done is profoundly doubtful* (Sen 1973: 97-8).
Whether cooperatives are particularly disadvantaged in this respect - having the worst of
both worlds - compared to wage labour modes of organization is an open question.
Certainly though the incentive problem presented by size appears to cut across all
production arrangements. In large corporations the residual claimants (shareholders) are
far removed from the productive process; and likewise in public sector enterprises the
ultimate profit receiver, the state, has its residual claimancy interest mediated through, and
represented by, successive layers of bureaucrats. Also, in existing planned economies
residual control is vested in the state via the party at a considerable distance from direct
producers. In all these cases motivation deficiencies are highly probable and require
stimulation devices of one kind or another.
The general question is currently under study as one consequence of imperfect information
and of information asymmetrically distributed amongst decision-takers. Contracts cannot
be complete and watertight where this is the case; there is a potential conflict of interest
between the individual and others within the team or group because some terms of the
needed contracts are differentially perceivable: some parties know more than others. In
the present instance work effort is such a 'hidden action*. These phenomena, said to be
pervasive in many economic activities, are labelled as problems of moral hazard:*11*
'defined as actions of economic agents in maximizing their own utility to the
detriment of others, in situations where they do not bear the full consequences or,
equivalently, do not enjoy the full benefits of their actions due to uncertainty and
incomplete or restricted contracts which prevent the assigment of full damages
(benefits) to the agent responsible* (Kotowitz 1987:549, original jmphasis).
To repeat, I raise such incentive issues not because I wish to assert that producers'
cooperatives are peculiarly prone to such deficiencies but rather because micro-level
queries like these need to supplement political economy debates about the desirability of
alternatives to the capitalist firm. What should also be noticeable is that there are other
difficulties that may arise. These include, first, the feasibility of substituting peer control
for hierarchical control in the pursuit of self-management democracy where the advantages
and disadvantages have to be weighed against each other.I12' Second, the sizes of the
production, decision-taking and accounting (for the purpose of distribution) units that are
[11] The idea of moral hazard arose in the theoretical literature on insurance against risk. If an insured person (or
organization) knows that he or she will be fully compensated for loss, eg. through fire, theft, accident or
crop failure, their behaviour is influenced thereby. In short, they take less care to avoid those contingencies
Oiat give rise to claims, and Oie risk therefore increases unbeknown to the insurer: hence the moral hazard
outcome and, in practice.the insistence by insurers on less than full compensation being payable.
[12] *Vxe question is whether the decisions made democratically by members, whether over an investment strategy,
over the details of organizational structure and delegation of authority, or over working conditions, can be
efficient in view of the fact that (a) ultimate decision-making rights are dispersed through the workforce
and (b) there arc limits to the acquisition of managerial experience and twining by the workforce as a
whole' (Bonin & Puttcmtan 1987:56).
cooperatively organized - and which need not coincide - are a key factor in determining
collusive action. The reason is that the mere existence of a common interest need not
preclude free riding, nor need it be a sufficient incentive by itself for individual and
collective action to coincide in the furtherance of group objectives. But size sufficiently
small to allow face to face contact, group awareness and mutual trust, in other words the
characteristics of a 'closed' group, seem to be significant in obviating many of these
difficulties.*13^ Third, where there are scale economies -potential falls in unit cost caused
by specialization, indivisible or lumpy inputs and division of labour - there appear to be no
reasons why these should not be as easily exploitable by cooperatives as by capitalist or
state enterprises. But, as raised under the previous head, the institutional limitation on size
required for efficient and equitable decision-talcing in self-management could be a
constraint upon increases in output scale and matching technology up to the minimum
efficient size. Again, this remains more a theoretical possibility than a supportable
generalization about cooperatives in view of their limited historical experience, small
numbers and the difficulty of testing such propositions in a satisfactory manner.
A final concern in this section is whether agriculture as an economic sector has
characteristics which favour or which hinder the emergence of self-managed organizations.
Up to now 1 have discussed producer cooperatives on the premise that what flows from
their distinctiveness (membership equality, collective ownership, participation and
distribution rules) has implications, positive and negative alike, which are common to all
productive activity. Yet agriculture has certain features differentiating it from
manufacturing and services which we should take account of, both for theoretical purposes
and for evaluating the performance of collectivized agriculture in the planned economies.
If we accept that a developing agricultural sector, under whatever system of allocation,
requires large 'public good1 inputs like infrastructure, research, education and extension
services (ie. technical advice and at times material assistance for nrw methods and new
technology), what are the implications for cooperatives? These support services have a
public good character in economic terms because their benefits are not separably
appropriable. No individual producer finds it profitable to invest in them by shouldering
the full cost of such inputs. This would seem to apply irrespective of the organizational and
institutional superstructure which may exist, whether family farms, capitalist
proprietorships with hired labour including company farms, or cooperative enterprises.
The public good characteristics of these inputs were not prominent in state and collective
farms in centrally planned economies during pre-reform days, presumably only because the
supplying institutions and agencies had little separate identity from all the others under the
system of administrative allocation. And furthermore, where private cost-accounting and
appropriation is not possible, public goods lose their distinctiveness. Their function
nevertheless is vital and, for example, criticism of service agencies by Soviet state and
collective farms has been lengthy and vociferous (Nove 1983: 88-9). With changes like the
personal responsibility system in China, public good provisioning outside family and
[13] The main condition for success (in collective action] is the ability of a group to suppress free riding... [success
is] expected to be the greater the smaller the group, the more homogeneous its origin, the longer its
members have been together or it has been in existence, tlie more complementary the goals of different
members, the closer the social and physical proximity among its members...' (de Janvry, Sadoulet &
Fafchamps 1989:364).
10
collective units is likely to become more visible and an arena for lobbying and bargaining.
By comparative international standards spending on agricultural research in China, for
instance, is low (World Bank 1986: 48). But beyond such consequences there do not seem
to be issues specific to cooperatives.
There may however be other determining features of agriculture which bear upon the
choice of efficient organizational form. These include:
spatial dispersion and the heterogeneity and immobility of land;
transport and travel costs are high and time-intensive;
seasonality of the production cycle;
information acquisition and transfer is costly;
special risk characteristics pertain to yield, pricing and timing;
multiple decision takers;
lengthy and sequential nature of work process;
managerial diseconomies of scale;
technology choice, specifically of capital-labour ratios, wider than in other sectors;
flexible responses are required on a continuous basis;
localized credit and tenure institutions (which affect price and market
responsiveness); .
• relatively elastic linkage between inputs and outputs. (Binswanger &
Rosenzweig 1986; Binswanger& Elgin 1988; Nolan 1988; Timmer 1988; Wadekin
1989).
Accepting that this list identifies at least some of what makes agriculture differentJW we
need to ask which characteristics or combination of characteristics influence the viability of
producer cooperatives in the sector. First, agriculture is decision-intensive'because of
'seasonality, geographical dispersion and the role of nsk and uncertainty...[so that]
decision-making is in fact based on rational assessments of higaly heterogeneous
environments [and] substantial knowledge of micro environments is necessary... (Timmer
1988- 295 300) Because of such variety and variability inherent in production decisions it
is contended that the separation of labour from management imposes an efficiency cost
On famL with labour forces larger than the (extended) family can supply this becomes
further accentuated with the diffusion of managerial input, so that diseconomies of scale
result in the sense that management effectiveness per unit of output declines. This is
pertinent to producers' cooperatives because of the incentive problems and monitoring
ESen^ earHer, as well as because their decision-taking must take longer
X ^ t o S solved: 'households in collectives have to take^vmgs and investment
decisions jointly, an extremely difficult task* (Binswanger & Elgin 1988. 4).
Secondly linking work effort to an identifiable product is difficult. This stems from the
following: E x t e n d e d time lapse between input and final output; agncultura1 work
c ™ be sub-divided into measurable segments and requires a flexible response no easily
a n S a t e d beforehand in the payment or distribution system; . P ™ * ^ ^ ^
physically dispersed and conditions may vary from one part of a farm to another. The
[14] This is a composite grouping of agriculture's features extracted from the sources cited; these contain
differences of emphasis and inference which I overtook here.
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upshot is that direct inspection is necessary to assess quality. With the limited exceptions
where piece-work can be instituted or subcontracted, this is a problem in all units greater
than the family farm, and it intensifies with rises in scale. Where land-holdings are private,
one solution is for the landlord to rent land beyond a threshold size to tenants or to enter
into share-cropping arrangements. But rental markets are unlikely to be ideologically
acceptable to a cooperative organization nor would extensive supervision be feasible or
efficient, as already remarked. So this is a special problem which dovetails with that of
incentives.1 J
Thirdly, production in agriculture contrasts markedly with industry in respect to the scale of
certain elements of technology and the labour process (the production function). Some
productive inputs are divisible so that their unit cost changes little if at all at higher output
volumes, for instance, seed, fertilizer, chemicals, livestock and land. Other resources like
large machinery items, transport equipment and buildings are lumpy in that they involve
minimum sizes for efficient use. Still other requirements like credit are lumpy in principle
(with fixed components of financing cost irrespective of amount), but dispersed and costly
information and transport limits the actual size, density and efficiency of markets
(Binswanger & Rosenzweig 1986; Nolan 1988).tl6^ It is necessary also to distinguish
ownership units from operational units because the imperatives of efficient scale apply
differently to them. Institutions like rental markets for land, for major inputs like
machinery, processing facilities and transportation have evolved to allow the accumulation
of ownership claims both greater and smaller than the size determined by efficient
operation. And similar forces, although not resulting in differential scales and rights to
property, underlay the institutions of Soviet agriculture after collectivization, like the
Machine Tractor Stations.
In view of the diversity and unpredictability of responses to the question of input lumpiness
and economies of scale in agriculture, it is perhaps not surprising tha* so few cooperatives
have been formed spontaneously by small fanners coming together (although this is not to
claim it as the only probable reason). Such cross-cutting complexity may also be the seed
of error in early socialist discussions with their implicit or explicit presumption that the
forces of production and of political necessity worked in both industry and agriculture
symmetrically towards the creation of large scale units operated bv a proletariat (Nolan
1988: 40f; Nove 1983:85-90,1989; Bellis 1989; Wadekin 1989:24).i17'
[15] Nove (1977: 139) quotes a saying common among Soviet tractor men: 'ploutfi deepen I see the director
coming*; and the same source comments *Who does not watch the work of the ploughman: the
accountant, the supervisor, the brigadier, the representative of the People's Control, the rural Soviet, the
agronomist, Vie agitator-potttical-organizer, and even a volunteer-quality<ontrotler. Yet what sort of a
peasant b it, if it is necessary to follow him about to ensure that he ploughs and harrows properly?1
[16] This is another problem treated in the economics of information, known as adverse selection. In a market
containing products or customers (like applicants for credit) of varying qualm whom the other transactors
(banks or credit agencies) cannot distinguish between, the process of exchange between buyers and sellers
then has peculiarities which make for inefficiency.
[17] Tiie ambition of the planners was to apply to agriculture the two great principles of industrialization and
modernization. Vic Sovkhozy were conceived as mechanized grain factories. The mass of peasants were
to be organized in Kolkhozy constituted on the same model But extravagant hopes of ensuring a supply of
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Experience in centrally planned economies and elsewhere
Production units in the collectivized agricultural sectors of the Soviet Union, Eastern
Europe and China differ fundamentally from the concept of producer cooperatives already
discussed in this paper.
• They did riot emerge out of a genuine voluntary movement but were imposed and
are still sustained by administrative fiat
* Management is appointed by bureaucrats or party officials.
* There is detailed intervention in decision-taking, including the imposition of
mandatory plan targets and of distribution principles that involve what are
essentially wage payments not dividend shares.
* Restrictions upon labour movement and occupational choice were imposed early
and in certain respects still exist.
In consequence, pre-reform collective farms in the Socialist bloc have been likened to the
manorial system of the Middle Ages in Europe (Bonin & Putterman 1987: 125; Nove 1983:
85-90); and as early as 1929 Bukharin characterised Soviet agrarian policies under Stalin as
'military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry* (Ellman 1984:7-8).
However, the initial formation of collectives and communes in the Soviet Union (1918-27)
and China (mid-fifties) was voluntary although not entirely spontaneous, as occurred more
recently also in other national examples like Tanzania. But in virtually all cases 'early
voluntarism gave way to the impatience of revolutionary leaders' and farmers were
ultimately coerced (Putterman 1985: 177). This raises tantalizing historical questions of
what might have been, including the research problem of disentangling tne outcomes of the
administrative planning system from those of collective organisation as such. Khan &
Ghai's observation, while pertinent, is far from being a consensus one: That so many
experiences of collective agriculture in the last half century have failed to serve as vehicles
of agricultural growth is probably due more to inappropriate over-all policies towards
agriculture than to any inherent difficulties with collective institutions' (1983:302). This is
a key issue about which no-one yet knows enough to venture a definitive judgement
Collective agriculture has been advocated under 'existing socialism' for a range of reasons
(Nolan 1987: 477-8). These include fear of an economically independent peasantry; the
need for higher off-farm marketing rates; and, within the sector, the raising of saving and
investment levels, the mobilizing of labour for accumulation purposes and the provision of
a conduit for new production technology. There was in addition the desire to counteract
the social and political costs of mechanization and economies of scale, believed to become
manifest in the polarization between capitalist landowners and rural proletariat in the
course of reaping the fruits of higher labour and land productivity.
tractors and other machines sufficient to make such a project viable in praczcal terms were disappointed'
(Can 1979:162).
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Which, if any, of these reasons have been vindicated in retrospect is debatable. 'Did
collectivization in fact contribute to capital accumulation?' has been a question subject to
considerable controversy in the past decade (Nove 1989: 176; Ellman 1979; Bellis 1989).
The weight of opinion at present is towards scepticism.
The truth appears to be, then, that by any measure, Soviet agriculture proved a
dead weight on growth of the Soviet economy; and this was so, I propose,
because collectivization was a massive policy error-no one stood to gain'
including the state. The contribution [to growth] that Ellman and others have
sought to attribute to collectivization belongs instead to the introduction of the
predatory agricultural procurement system - which helped to limit the losses
collectivization brought about and thus raised the share of marketed output in
the face of a decline in total output' (Millar 1983: 116). The view that "capital-
was extracted from the villages by collectivization to invest in industry and offset
against ^ imports is an illusion....The reason sovkhozy have become the
predominant form of agriculture in the last decade is not that they strengthen
socialist agriculture. In fact, kolkJiozy cost less and require less investment....It is
because the kolfdioz system cannot produce a viable agriculture....The myth that
collectivization was harsh but effective does not withstand an examination of
the performance of Soviet agriculture' (Medvedev 1987: 96-7). The vision dies
hard of agriculture as a resource reservoir to be tapped indiscriminately,
without reinvestment or adverse consequences for growth, on behalf of the
urban economy* (Timmer 1988:301).
While agriculture may have been the 'Cinderella sector' in planned economies in the initial
period after collectivization, in the sense of being last in the queue for resources, that is no
longer the case in the Soviet Union, Hungary and elsewhere.*181 In the 1970s 'the
agricultural sector [typically] was absorbing over one quarter rf Soviet new fixed
investment' (Nolan 1987: 478), and other estimates make the proportion even higher
(Medvedev 1987:418). Despite this large throughput of'fuel' the sector has not grown at a
satisfactory rate, and an analogy can be drawn with a vehicle stuck in low gear: to achieve
higher production volumes the design itself has to be changed. China's post-Mao shift to
the 'household production responsibility* or 'household contracting* system has generated
large and sustained increases in farm output. This constitutes a form of decoUectivization
and it provides evidence of great systemic constraints upon productivity and performance
existing pre-reform (Sen 1983; Ashton 1984; Bonin & Puttennan 1987; Nolan 1988).
Besides being technically inefficient (low productivity of labour, land and capital, high
energy intensity, high spoilage rates), CPE agriculture still shows certain developing
country characteristics despite the trend changes of the past forty years. "With the
[28] 'With regard to the distribution of the accumulation burden between social classes, the original idea was to
shift it mainly to the peasantry. Viis failed, either because of the necessin (as in the USSR) to avoid
complete collapse of agriculture in the wake of the collectivization disaster by directing additional
investment to the countryside, or because the idea was abandoned more (China) or less (Eastern Europe)
explicitly. This is to say not that the peasantry did not suffer enormously (clthou^x probably nowhere to
the same extent as in the USSR), but merely that the sufferings extended to the population as a whole,
industrial workers included' (Brus &. LasJd 1989:24)
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exceptions of Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungry and recently Poland, more women than
men were employed in agriculture in the 1980s; similarly, the age composition of the
agricultural labour force shows 'a growing proportion of older workers* (ILO 1984: 88-9).
More important, this sector shares with the economy as a whole the typical pattern of
imitative development, which is the inability to break out of 'extensive growth* based on
quantitative increases in capital equipment and labour and switch to "intensive growth'
coming from higher allocative and X-efficiency*191 along with technical progress.
So, concerning the collectivization experience of planned economies, it is difficult to find
^"i positive statements at the present time - at least not in the English language literature
- and judgements like the following are the norm.
'Collectivization, Soviet style, is surely a disastrous course, disastrous economically
(production and efficiency suffer) and disastrous politically (mass coercion,
"justification" of terror, cruelty, and so on)....It is essential [though] to distinguish
agricultural cooperation from the Soviet-type of collectivization. The vital
differences are voluntary as against compulsory member-ship; and self-
government as against control from above* (Nove 1983: 85-6).
In the perspective of the present paper, the important question is what can be learned from
the deformities of CPE collective farming which has a bearing on the viability of
agricultural producers' cooperatives elsewhere, particularly in South Africa. Much that is
negative is part of the answer. But the observation by Nove just quoted may also provide
comfort for advocates of cooperative organistion, as suggested earlier. A great deal of
experimentation is now in progress in CPE agriculture, most of it imerpretabie as steps - in
certain respects the retracing of steps - towards cooperative forms (Wadekin 1989, Brada &
Wadekin 1988). The innovation of small production groups, whether 'contract brigades,
'normless teams* or family responsibility units and partnerships, has tiie common aim of
switching to remuneration by productive performance instead of fixed work norms linked
to what in effect are wage payments. There are major obstacles to be overcome, some of a
psychoiogicalnaturej201 but in March 1988 Gorbachev himself declared that collective
and state farms should in the near future become in essence cooperative associations of
financially independent contract groups', with the 'leasehold contract* to be regarded as the
most appropriate (Brus & Laski 1989: 145; also Kornai 1986; Aganbegyan 1988).
Cooperative forms elsewhere, like worker-managed enterprises in Yugoslavia and Israeli
kibbutzim set a much more promising precedent. But whether they are generalisable to
other environments and other circumstances is another question. Yugoslav economic
performance in the past forty years has been impressive but flawed, with high rates of
inflation and unemployment, particularly on a regional basis. At this moment that
economy seems vulnerable for a mixture of economic and political reasons that may come
[19] Tlwt is, the best allocation of resources between producing units and the best use of them within such units,
resDectivcly-
(201 M reform of this sort requires officials (sovkhoz directors, kolkhoz chairmen and others) to negotiate and
observe contractual obligations with their own subordinates, those to whom rdOieno they had the power to
rive orders. A big change in approach is needed, complicated by the fact that these officials will
themselves be under pressure from above to fulfill production and delivery f^ts' (Nove J98& 21). Wliat
wilt have to be unlearned in other words is administrirovanie, which is ^-^eaucratic decision-making in
accordance with the laws of hierarchy and subordination'(Ellman 19S8:32).
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to bear on our concerns in the future but at present require more research and more space
than is available in this paper.
Are the kibbutzim 'a model for developing countries*, as posed in the title of one useful
source? (Morawetz 1983: Barkai 1980) The sensible answer must be that we do not know.
While most Israeli agriculture has some cooperative dimension to it, kibbutzniks comprise
only 3-4 per cent of the total population; furthermore for many, probably most, existing
kibbutzim industrial activity has become economically more important than agriculture.
The original kibbutzniks as a social group were self-selected voluntary members, better
educated than the average, with strongly-held egalitarian or socialist beliefs, as well as
subscribing to nationalist goals which led to high commitment and a strong work ethic To
some extent these characteristics have altered over the past 60-70 years; for example,
certain kibbutzim now hire outside labour at wage rates lower than the incomes paid to
members. In addition, all kibbutzim receive some measure of assistance from the state,
and it appears that no single kibbutz has been allowed to fail on purely economic grounds.
3
Here we should recall the distinction drawn earlier in the paper (p.^) between cooperatives
or collectives (distribution according to work input) and communes (distribution according
to equal claims). The kibbutz is an instance of the latter and its limitations as an example
for our purpose, which is looking at self-management organisation as a whole, will
therefore be apparent.
'What I am arguing is that a kibbutz - that is, a commune in which all
incomes are equal regardless of work input and productivity - is not
transplantable on a large scale to developing countries, whether such
a transplant is attempted on a voluntary basis (because few people
would have the ideological commitment necessary for it to survive in
the long term) or by compulsion (because in the absence of material
incentives many members would work below full pace, inevitably
causing an eventual breakdown)* (Morawetz 1983:235)
Assessment
The following observations are stimulated by sources that identify the thinking of political
groups on agricultural organisation in South, Africa's post-apartheid economy (Lodge 1986;
Archer 1987; ANC 1988; Marcus 1989; Wilson & Ramphele 1989). First, one cannot
appraise programmatic statements that project only a vague and general vision, expressed
in terms liptke 'land nationalization', 'collective/communal ownership', 'land redivided
amongst those who work it', 'collective farms created to exist side by side with state farms
to banish famine and land hunger1, and so on. Such language has a function, but not at the
level of discussion that this conference should be initiating. We need much more detailed,
specific and operational descriptions of what policy options are advocated before the issues
raised in this paper can begin to be appraised within the South African environment.
Secondly, there appears to be a presumption that land questions are inherently more
charged with commitment and emotion than are other sources of economic conflict; that
they carry more ideological baggage, particularly for rural people. This may well be so, but
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it does not mean that we should allow our critical muscles to slacken when appraising
proposals that emanate for instance, from within the 'widely shared Utopian anti-capitalism'
that Lodge identifies amongst certain groups (1986: 1). A useful corrective is to take a
comparative look at precedents elsewhere in the world.
The Peruvian and Cuban examples show that "land hunger" comes
from unemployment or from the risk of unemployment or from ill-
paid employment "Land hunger" is not a specifically "peasant"
feeling. "Peasants" who are given good alternative employment lose
their "land hunger" (as has happened to millions of them in the
industrialized countries), and...rural people of all descriptions
(whether "peasants", or labourers or squatters, and so on) desire land
of their own in order to have an assured supply of food and an assured
opportunity of work. They will cease to desire land if such things are
assured to them in some other way. What is in question is whether
the land is an end in itself or whether land has an instrumental value,
as a means of getting assured work and as a way to earn one's living.
(Martinez-Alier 1977:29).
A third implication of this survey is that the history of ventures with collectivismand state
farming have generally been ones starting from household and peasant production bases.
By contrast, in South Africa the beginning point would be a rather more variegated
institutional' structure, with the bulk of production organised capitalistically in large
proprietary units employing wage labour and pursuing profit; but existing alongside a
neglected subsector containing a fair segment of the population engaged in subsistence
activities. We may have more to learn by a study of the Latin American experience where
land reform in the 1960's aimed at transforming haciendas and latifundia into
democratically managed cooperatives, as in Chile and Peru (McCl-'ntock, Podesta &
Scurrah 1984; Caballero 1983). Future research efforts might steer in this direction.
In conclusion, I think it is wholly premature to draw any inferences about the potential role
producer cooperatives might play in South African agriculture. This paper has
intentionally raised a number of problems with self-management organisations. One
should mount criticism though with one's eyes open, and recognise the limited range of
options available to a political regime bent on some measure of land redistribution,
however mild. But having said that, one also needs to be quite clear that their history and
contemporary practice do not give cause for optimism about such modes of agricultural
production. One does not have to be a market ideologue favouring private property rights
to be profoundly sceptical about the wisdom of advocating agricultural collectives along
planned economy lines. And the alternative, true cooperative forms of the kind sketched in
this paper, remain as yet unknown and untried.
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